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Abstract 
Attitudinal embeddings, such as ‘I hope that murder is wrong’ or ‘she is glad 
that eating meat is not wrong’ are a less substantial problem for expressivists 
than is standardly thought. If  expressivists are entitled to talk of  normative 
beliefs, they can explain what it is to for an attitude to be semantically related 
to a normative content in terms of  being functionally related to a belief  with a 
normative content. 
Keywords: Expressivism, Quasirealism, Frege-Geach Problem, Many Attitudes 
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1. Introduction 
‘I hope that murder is wrong’. ‘He’s glad that murder is wrong’. ‘She wonders if  eating 
meat is wrong’. Attributions like these are thought to pose a serious problem for 
expressivists, being especially tricky looking instances of  the general problem of  
embeddings (M. Schroeder 2008 and 2013; and Carr 2015). What is the person who 
hopes that murder is wrong hoping for, if  the normative term ‘wrong’ is a device for 
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expressing disapproval? Is the attitude picked out by the word ‘hope’ in ‘I hope that 
murder is wrong’ the same as that picked out in ‘I hope it is raining’? Contemporary 
quasirealists already hold that normative beliefs are a different kind of  attitude from 
nonnormative beliefs. Will we also need normative versus nonnormative versions of  
every attitude marked out by folk psychology? This has been identified as the many 
attitudes problem (M. Schroeder 2008 and 2013; Shiller 2017; and Beddor 2020). 
 I will argue that, despite appearances, the problem is actually not particularly 
difficult; or at least, the difficulty is simply the difficulty of  the Frege-Geach problem, the 
problem of  logical embedding. If  the expressivist can solve that, solving the problem of  
attitudinal embeddings is easy. The trick is to keep in mind that the expressivist does not 
owe much by way of  an account of  the attitudes themselves, only of  the normative 
content. She only needs to tell us what the clause ‘murder is wrong’ contributes to ‘Bob 
hopes that murder is wrong’. She does not owe us an account of  what hope is, beyond a 
general commitment to some form of  functionalism about attitudes in general. 
 My proposal is that for any propositional attitude other than belief, the attitude 
takes p as its content in virtue of  standing in the right functional relations to the belief  
that p. Sebastian Köhler (2017) and Bob Beddor (2020) have already proposed solutions 
of  this type. However, their solutions come with additional theoretical commitments we 
need not accept. Köhler’s solution, to be fully realised, depends on explaining what it is 
to believe, desire, hope, or fear that p without making any appeal to propositional content 
at all in the explanation. This is an ambitious project, requiring a purely functional, 
content-free way of  individuating each attitude type. In short, for Köhler, the expressivist 
does owe us an account of  what hope is. Beddor proposes that the expressivist offer an 
account of  what it is to desire that p when p is normative, and then to reduce all 
remaining attitudes to combinations of  beliefs and desires. This is quite obviously to give 
an account of  what hope is. My proposal will be simpler, requiring only minimal 
commitments, commitments implicit in much of  expressivism already. 
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 To anticipate one source of  potential dissatisfaction, the solution may seem 
overly simple. The basic idea is that to hope that murder is wrong is to be in a mental 
state that interacts with the belief  that murder is wrong in the same way that hope that it 
is raining interacts with the belief  that it is raining. Some extra precision will be added, 
and some extra sophistication. What I will try to establish in this paper is that this very 
simple and minimal answer is sufficient for addressing the specific problem created by 
expressivism. What remains of  the problem is not a specifically expressivist problem, but 
a general problem in philosophy of  mind (and empirical psychology) about the nature of  
intentional attitudes. As evidence of  this analysis, I will show that both Beddor and 
Köhler’s proposals are more specific versions of  the solution I will offer, and that they 
are only able to offer more detail in virtue of  taking on auxiliary hypotheses in 
philosophy of  mind which an expressivist could consistently deny. In short, much of  the 
apparent difficulty surrounding the many attitudes problem is simply that people have 
expected the expressivist to solve problems that have nothing to do with expressivism. 
The only commitment the expressivist needs is, as noted, a general commitment to 
functionalism—and most expressivists were already implicitly committed to that. 
 I will start with an analysis of  what the problem really is, with the aim of  
establishing that the simple answer will suffice. 
1. The Problem 
Beddor begins his discussion of  the many attitudes problem with a statement of  its 
importance to the broader expressivist project: 
…[N]oncognitivists aspire to give an account of  all normative 
thought. Given this lofty ambition, the standard practice of  focusing 
on one species of  normative thought—the doxastic attitudes—seems 
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parochial. And it is worrisome, because if  noncognitivists cannot give 
a plausible account of  the nondoxastic attitudes, then their entire 
project is doomed. 
(2020: 2791) 
Beddor is correct that ‘noncognitivists aspire to give an account of  all normative 
thought’. But there are two ways to interpret the explanatory demand the aspiration 
imposes. Does the expressivist need to explain what it is to think about normative stuff, 
or does she need to explain what it is to think about normative stuff? To put this more 
clearly: does she need to provide an account of  what attitudes such as hope, wonder, and 
gladness are, or does she need an account of  what it is for these attitudes to have a 
normative content? It may be possible to answer one without the other. Based on his 
proposal, Beddor seems to think the expressivist must do both, and that she will solve 
the problem of  what it is for a thought to have normative content by providing a 
reductive account of  what these thoughts are. 
 Beddor begins by providing a reductive account of  desire in terms of  
dispositions. A desire is made up of  a disposition to act in ways that, according to one’s 
beliefs, make it more likely that content of  the desire will be realised, and also a 
disposition to experience pleasure when one believes the desire’s content obtains, 
displeasure when one believes it does not. Beddor then reduces all further propositional 
attitudes to combinations of  beliefs and desires. Along with the standing expressivist 
commitment to reduce normative beliefs to desire-like states with nonnormative 
contents, this represents a commitment to giving a reductive explanation of  the nature 
of  all normative thought. The explanation is an explanation of  what it is to think—a 
reductive account of  what it is to desire, hope, fear, intend, and even to believe when the 
belief  in question is normative. By way of  this reduction of  normative attitudes to 
dispositional clusters, we can also say what it is to have thoughts with normative content 
without making reference to anything normative in the explanation. 
 4
Deflating Many Attitudes
 Beddor’s proposal may be correct. But it rests on an extremely contentious thesis 
in philosophy of  mind, that all other attitudes reduce to beliefs and desires. Imagine that 
we conclude that Bratman (1999) and Holton (2009) are right: intention must be 
understood as a sui generis attitude. It would be very surprising if  it followed from this 
that expressivism were unworkable. But then the solution to the many attitudes problem 
should not depend on Bratman and Holton being wrong. 
 More generally, Beddor’s solution does not improve the expressivist’s dialectical 
position. It establishes that the expressivist can solve the many attitudes problem—but 
only at the price of  taking on contentious theoretical commitments on a whole range of  
debates where we would have thought expressivism could be neutral. 
 The psychologist Lisa Feldman Barrett has, for example, challenged the idea that 
any of  our emotions are natural kinds, holding instead that our emotion terms (‘angry’, 
‘sad’, ‘frightened’) pick out a disjunction of  different psychological responses, held 
together family resemblances that are culturally specific (Barrett 2006, 2012, and 2018; 
and Gendron et al. 2014). Even if  this is wrong about some emotions, it may well be true 
of  others. It would be unsurprising if  ‘amused that’, ‘annoyed that’, and ‘elated that’ 
failed to pick out natural kinds. In any case, right or wrong, Barrett’s thesis seems 
orthogonal to the truth of  expressivism. But if  it is true, being in an emotional state 
cannot be given necessary and jointly sufficient conditions, as Beddor’s reductive thesis 
would have it. 
 Similarly, Beddor proposes a unified account of  the nature of  desire, in terms of  
the dispositional states to which it reduces (2794ff.). This may be correct, but it is one 
very specific analysis. Timothy Schroeder has argued that desires should not be 
understood dispositionally; rather, ‘desire’ is a natural kind term for a representation in 
the reward system of  the brain (2004). He contrasts this with another kind of  view which 
treats ‘desire’ as a generic term for picking out a variety of  different motivating states, 
which may differ in many of  their psychological properties, despite having a few key 
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ones in common (4-5). Again, it would be surprising to find out that the truth of  
expressivism depended on this debate. Beddor’s proposal wins one battle for the 
expressivist, but only by dragging her into many more. 
 What the expressivist should want is a solution in more general terms, so that it 
does not depend on highly specific and controversial theses in philosophy of  mind. This 
means that expressivists should not try to give reductive accounts of  what hope, fear, 
gladness, and wonder are. It would be no objection to a metaethical realist that they lack 
a reductive story of  what it is to hope that murder is wrong, even though the lack of  
such a story would mean that the realist has in some sense failed to account for all of  
normative thought. 
 As Beddor notes, the realist has an answer unavailable to expressivism. The realist 
can simply say: ‘Give me your favourite story about what’s involved in hoping for a 
promotion, or world peace, or what have you. On my view, to hope that lying is 
permissible is to be in the same sort of  psychological state, just with a normative 
proposition as its content’ (2020: 2790). Expressivists cannot appeal to normative 
content in their explanation of  what it is to hope that murder is wrong. Quasirealists do 
allow for talk of  normative propositions, but as we will see, talk of  them is a device of  
communication and generalisation. Such propositions are not supposed to bear 
explanatory weight. 
 It does not follow, however, that the expressivist must give a reductive account of  
what hope is. What she owes us is an explanation, in nonnormative terms, of  what it is 
for an attitude to have normative content. She needs to explain what it is to think about 
normative stuff, not what it is to think. I will spell out here how the expressivist can do this, 
while making only minimal commitments about the nature of  the attitudes themselves. 
2. Believing Murder Is Wrong 
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How do expressivists handle the attribution ‘Bob believes that murder is wrong’? 
 It is now commonplace that expressivists will talk of  normative truths, 
properties, and beliefs, so long as these are understood in a deflationary sense. A 
deflationary account tells us that even though some term is grammatically a noun or a 
predicate, it should not be understood in terms of  its reference, whether an object or 
property or intension. Rather, the meaning of  the term is given by some other use that it 
serves (Köhler 2017: 194; and 2018: 342 and fn. 11). For example, despite the fact that it 
is a predicate, ‘true’ does not refer to a property of  being true, at least not according to the 
deflationist. Rather, the meaning of  the predicate is exhausted by the T-schema: 
 ‘S’ is true if  and only if  S. 
The predicate is used for disquotation, indirect assertion, and quantification.  For 2
example, with the predicate, I can say ‘Everything Kant says is true’, and thereby commit 
myself  to everything Kant said without repeating it all, or without even knowing 
everything that Kant said. 
 A similar rule provides the meaning of  ‘proposition’: 
 ‘S’ expresses the proposition that S. 
Such a term allows us a convenient way of  making generalisations, claims about 
translatability, and how our attitudes relate to what’s linguistically communicated.  3
 For a classic statement, see (Horwich 1998).2
 For an excellent account of  how that-clauses can serve these functions, see (Köhler 2017 and 3
2018). While Köhler is working within the framework of  metasemantic expressivism, much of  
what he says about propositions should be available to semantic varieties of  expressivism as well. 
On the other hand, Billy Dunaway (2010) identifies potential difficulties with deflationary 
propositions. See (Köhler 2017) for a reply.
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 Attitudinal embeddings are one aspect of  that last use, of  how propositions let us 
relate our mental states to what’s linguistically communicated. To see how they do this, 
consider a similarly minimalist account of  belief. To believe that p is simply to be in a 
mental state that would be expressed by sincerely asserting the sentence ‘p’. Furthermore, 
whether a given sentence is assertoric or not is simply a matter of  its grammatical and 
logical form. ‘Murder is wrong’ can thus be asserted, and its assertion expresses a belief
—that murder is wrong (Timmons 1999: 135ff.; and Dreier 2004). 
 So we have a story about how propositional-clauses serve to link one attitude, 
belief, to what’s asserted. The problem is extending this story to include other 
propositional attitudes. We can say what it is for a belief  to be related to the proposition 
p: it is for the assertoric sentence ‘p’ to express the belief. But what is it for desire or 
hope or fear to be related to p? 
3. The General Form of  Solutions to the Frege-Geach Problem 
The second step is to look at what most solutions to the Frege-Geach Problem have in 
common. The problem, remember, is that of  offering a systematic and constructive 
account of  the meaning of  arbitrarily complex sentences, that predicts the right kind of  
semantic relations between these sentences.  The conditional sentence ‘If  murder is 4
wrong then encouraging murder is wrong’ needs to have the right kind of  logical 
relations to ‘Murder is wrong’, for example. 
 What most solutions propose is to explain the semantic (including logical) 
relations sentences stand in to each other in terms of  the functional relations between 
the beliefs expressed (Blackburn 1984; Gibbard 1990; Björnsson 2001; Sinclair 2011; and 
 See (Woods 2017) for overview of  the problem.4
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Baker & Woods 2015).  Let’s say the belief  that murder is wrong is type-identical with 5
disapproval of  murder. Then the belief  that if  murder is wrong then encouraging others 
to murder is wrong will be type-identical to some state bearing appropriate functional or 
rational relations to disapproval of  murder. It might be, for example, a higher-order 
attitude: the belief  in the conditional might be type identical to some negative attitude 
toward disapproving of  murder while not disapproving of  encouraging murder 
(Blackburn 1984; and Sinclair 2012). Alternately, it might be identified as a (possibly 
complex) state with the functional role of  producing a state of  disapproval of  
encouraging murder when the agent already disapproves of  murder, and which prevents 
the disapproval of  murder when the agent already approves (or tolerates) encouraging 
others to murder (Gibbard 2003; and Baker & Woods 2015).  In any case, a sentence of  6
the form ‘if  p then q’ expresses a mental state which bears appropriate functional 
relations to the mental states expressed by ‘p’ and ‘q’, for any ‘p’ and ‘q’. 
4. The Solution 
Expressivists can tell a similar story about embeddings under attitudinal terms. How does 
the meaning ‘Murder is wrong’ relate to the sentence ‘Bob is glad that murder is wrong’? 
The first expresses the belief  that murder is wrong. The second ascribes to Bob a state 
functionally related in the proper way to the belief  that murder is wrong. 
 The rough idea is this, to be glad that murder is wrong is to be in a psychological 
state that depends on the belief  that murder is wrong, and goes away when this belief  
goes away. Similarly for being sad or angry that murder is wrong. And because we want 
our account to be uniform, we must say the same about being glad, sad, or angry that 
 An exception to this is Mark Schroeder, who tries to account for the semantic relations between 5
sentences by appeal to further semantic relations between the contents of  the relevant attitudes 
(2008 and 2013).




grass is green. Attitudinal relations to propositions, other than the belief-relation, are 
mediated by a belief  in the same proposition. 
 A bit more rigorously: 
For any propositional attitude other than belief, A, the content of  A is p 
if  and only if  A stands in the right kind of  functional relations to the 
belief  that p. 
A does occur on both sides of  the proposal, but remember the thesis is not intended to 
be reductive of  A. Giving reductive accounts of  attitudes is a project in psychology, 
cognitive science, and philosophy of  mind. It is, as noted before, outside the purview of  
metaethics or semantics. The target of  analysis is not A, but having p as a content. 
 Admittedly, p also appears on the right side of  the biconditional. But the 
biconditional is not intended to stand alone. The assumption is that the expressivist 
already has an account of  what it is to believe that p when p is normative, that can be 
given in terms in which p no longer appears. On the other hand, if  p is not normative, 
the expressivist does not necessarily want to analyse it away. (The statement above is 
completely trivial in the nonnormative case, but the expressivist never promised to say 
anything interesting about nonnormative cases.) To finalise the proposal, the expressivist 
need only plug in her preferred account of  normative belief. 
 Unfortunately, for some attitudes, standing in the right kind of  functional relation 
to the belief  that p is not sufficient to determine that the agent holds that attitude toward 
p. It may be that to desire that p one must be disposed to feel happy that p and frustrated 
that ~p. But note, first of  all, that we are now individuating the desire that p only partly 
on the basis of  its relation to the belief  that p. The belief  that ~p is also part of  how we 
individuate it. Nor are these the only important functional relations for determining the 
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desire’s content. The desire that p must also stand in functional relations to the relevant 
means-end beliefs, to beliefs that x-ing is a necessary means to p. 
 Of  course, one might argue, as Köhler does, that desires with normative contents 
do not motivate action. So they cannot stand in functional relations to means-end beliefs 
(2017: 206). But the proposal here is neutral on whether ‘desire’ picks out a unified class 
of  mental states, or a disjunction of  different kinds of  mental states, held together by 
family resemblance or certain practical or theoretical interests. Köhler may be right that 
some desires do not have the functional role of  motivating action. But some clearly do, 
and these desires must be partially individuated by their relation to the belief  that x-ing is 
a necessary means to p, and not simply by their relation to the belief  that p. So we need 
to tell a story about these. 
 The belief  that x-ing is a necessary means to p stands in some semantic relation 
to p, as does the belief  that ~p, just as the belief  that if  p then q does. In the case of  the 
last belief, we explained this semantic relation in terms of  the functional relations 
between the conditional belief  and the belief  in the antecedent. While the functional 
relation between the means-end belief  and the belief  that p is presumably more 
complicated, we can say the belief  that x-ing is a necessary means to p is a state that has 
the functional role of  preventing the agent from believing that p so long as she does not 
believe that she has or will x. 
 This suggests the following. The content of  A is p just in case A is appropriately 
functionally related to the belief  that p, or to other attitudes that are appropriately 
functionally related to the belief  that p, or to attitudes functional related to attitudes 
functionally related to… 
 So the improved solution would go like this: 
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For any propositional attitude other than belief, A, the content of  A is p 
if  and only if  A stands in the right kind of  functional relations to other 
attitudes which are semantically related to p. 
And we can combine this with the following inductive definition: 
A is semantically related to p if  and only if  
(i) A is the belief  that p; or 
(ii) A is functionally related in the right kind of  way to some 
attitude, B, which is semantically related to p. 
With this in place, we can accommodate other potentially troubling attitudes. Hoping or 
fearing that murder is wrong are likely functionally incompatible with the belief  that 
murder is not wrong. To hope murder is wrong presumably involves a disposition to 
become happy when presented with evidence for the belief  that murder is wrong, and to 
become unhappy when presented with evidence that it is not. That is, many attitudes are 
constituted by functional relations, not to a belief  that shares their content, but to other 
mental states functionally related to such a belief. 
 Unfortunately this still does not account for all the ways an attitude may be 
semantically related to p. Köhler, for example, calls attention to the attitude of  
entertaining the thought that p (2017: 206). He proposes that ‘to entertain a thought is to 
simulate the corresponding belief, where “simulation” is understood as running the 
belief  “off-line”’ (ibid.). But a simulation of  the belief  that p is not obviously functionally 
related to the belief  that p, at least in the sense of  ‘functionally related’ at work in (ii) 
above. In that context, A is functionally related to B when A and B are disposed to affect 
or interact with each other causally.  Köhler does not say much about what is involved in 7
 Thanks to a referee for pointing out this problem.7
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simulation, but an obvious thought is that we simulate a belief  by imagining that we have 
it. This can causally interact with the relevant belief—imagining what it would be like to 
believe that p may play a role in suppositional reasoning, and so make it more or less 
likely that I come to believe that p. But it is questionable whether any such relations to 
belief  are essential to being a state of  imagining. 
 This is actually an instance of  a wider problem. Higher-order attitudes and 
metalinguistic attitudes are all semantically related to various contents. If  I believe that 
Bob believes that it is raining, my belief  is semantically related to <Bob believes that it is 
raining>, but also to <it is raining>. It is unclear, though, that there are any functional 
relations between my belief  about Bob’s belief  and my belief  that it is raining. More 
importantly, even if  there are, this seems like an unnecessarily roundabout way of  
explaining why my belief  is semantically related to <it is raining>. Here is a more natural 
alternative: my higher-order belief  is semantically related to the relevant proposition 
because it is about a functional state which is itself  semantically related to the relevant 
proposition. 
 This also helps address metalinguistic attitudes. Let’s say I believe ‘Mord ist 
schlecht’ means that murder is wrong. Again, this belief  is semantically related to 
<murder is wrong>, but it is unclear that it bears any essential functional relations to the 
belief  that murder is wrong. Again, the obvious explanation is that belief  either itself  
represents the sentence as a conventional expression of  a functional state semantically 
related to <murder is wrong>, or else is functionally related to a tacit understanding that 
the sentence conventionally expresses such a functional state. (People do not need to 
explicitly believe expressivism in order to have metalinguistic attitudes; however, 
expressivism is a theory of  our natural languages, and so, if  it is true, mastering a 
language must involve at least tacit understanding of  how sentences are used to express 
attitudes.) 




 A is semantically related to p if  and only if  
(i) A is the belief  that p; or 
(ii) A is functionally related in the right kind of  way to some 
attitude, B, which is semantically related to p; or 
(iii) A is about an attitude, B, which is semantically related to p. 
With this addition we can handle entertaining the thought that p. To entertain the 
thought that p is to imagine what it would be like to believe that p; it is to imagine what it 
would be like to be in a certain functional state. 
4.1. Commitments of  the View 
  
Before moving on to the second objection, let us review what the solution is meant to 
accomplish, and what it is not. As Beddor noted, the realist can give the following answer 
to what it is to hope that murder is wrong. Take your favourite story about what it is to 
hope that p when p is nonnormative. To hope that murder is wrong is to stand in that 
same kind of  psychological state, only to the content murder is wrong. My position is that 
the expressivist should try as far as possible to emulate that kind of  answer. So, take your 
favoured story about how hope that p is functionally related, both directly and via the 
mediation of  other attitudes, to the belief  that p, when p is nonnormative. To hope that 
murder is wrong is to be in a state with the same kind of  functional relations to the 
belief  that murder is wrong. This is compatible with the hope reducing to a complex of  
belief  and desires which are in turn individuated functionally. It is also compatible with 
‘hope’ being a label for a disjunction of  different kinds of  functional states held together 
by a family resemblance. It is neutral, as far as possible, on what it is to think. 
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 This is not the same as being completely neutral, however. The solution does 
assume that some form of  functionalism about propositional attitudes is correct. 
Attitudes such as hope and fear are defined in terms of  their functional relations; 
attitudes have their propositional content in virtue of  their functional relations. So the 
solution is incompatible with strong phenomenal intentionality, the view that the intentional 
content of  a mental state is fully determined by its phenomenology (see [Bourget & 
Mendolovici 2019] for overview). 
 Is the solution, then, vulnerable to the objection I raised against Beddor and 
Köhler, that it forces expressivists to take a stand where we would have thought she 
could remain neutral? First, both Beddor and Köhler’s solutions explicitly presuppose 
functionalism as well (Beddor 2020: 2791ff.; and Köhler 2017: 199ff.). In short, all extant 
solutions presuppose functionalism. The proposal on offer has the advantage, then, of  
weaker commitments than its rivals. Even if  it drags the expressivist into battles she 
would rather have avoided, it drags her into fewer. It should also be kept in mind that 
many expressivists had no intention of  remaining neutral on this particular point. 
Functionalism is a presupposition of  the dominant strategy for solving the Frege-Geach 
problem, considered in section 3. So, for the majority of  expressivists, functionalism is 
already a commitment of  the theory. In summary, the solution brings no extra theoretical 
commitments for most expressivists; and for the remainder, it comes with the weakest 
commitments currently on offer. 
 A final clarification should be made. To say that the solution presupposes 
functionalism and is incompatible with strong phenomenal intentionality is not to say 
that it must deny that mental states have a phenomenology. Beddor and Köhler both 
define desires partially in terms of  phenomenology—roughly the way that believing or 
imagining the desire’s satisfaction causes pleasure (Beddor 2020: 2796; Köhler 2017: 206). 
The disposition to produce pleasure, pain, or some other felt experience in interaction 
with other attitudes may well be part of  the functional role of  a given mental state. What 
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is ruled out are views on which the content of  an attitude is solely a matter of  how it 
feels, on which functional roles are not necessary for determining the content of  an 
attitude.  8
5. Objections 
5.1. Doesn’t the Expressivist Owe Us Something More?  
A series of  related objections stem from disbelief  that the problem can be addressed this 
easily. 
 As was noted earlier, the metaethical realist does not owe us much of  an 
explanation of  what it is to hope that murder is wrong. This is because the question of  
what hope is, or what propositions are, are questions for philosophy of  mind and 
language in general. There is no special metaethical problem here. So why would the 
expressivist owe us more? 
 Due to her commitment to an unorthodox theory of  meaning the expressivist 
needs to show that she can offer a systematic story about the contribution a normative 
clause makes to an attitudinal ascription in a way that is clearly compatible with her 
expressivist commitments (M. Schroeder 2013). As Beddor notes, this means an 
explanation that makes no reference to normative propositions in its explanans. But this is 
all that is special to the expressivist: she needs an explanation of  what it is for an attitude 
to have normative content which does not invoke normative content in the explanans. 
The proposal here provides a general recipe for how to do that. So far no reason why the 
expressivist needs to answer more general problems in philosophy of  mind, such as what 
it is to hope, has been given. 
 For an example of  such a view, see (Mendolovici 2018).8
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 It’s worth repeating in this context that Beddor’s proposal is a special cases of  the 
more general solution proposed here. Beddor reduces all attitudes to various 
combinations of  beliefs and desires, with desires analysed in terms of  dispositional 
properties to produce certain events in the presence of  beliefs with the right kind of  
content. Beliefs with normative content are then given the expressivist treatment. This is 
clearly one way of  specifying the functional roles relating each attitude type to beliefs 
with the relevant content. But, again, suppose Bratman and Holton are correct: intention 
is a sui generis attitude, irreducible to beliefs and desires. This is still compatible with 
individuating the content of  a given intention on the basis of  its functional relations to 
beliefs. The intention that one does something wrong, for example, could be a state with 
the function (i) of  being relatively stable, (ii) of  causing, in conjunction with the belief  
that X-ing is a necessary means to doing something wrong, an intention to perform 
action X, and (iii) of  going out of  existence when one believes that doing something 
wrong is not possible.  9
 In short, the most obvious way of  providing more detailed answers to the many 
attitudes problem is to simply combine the general proposal given in this paper with 
auxiliary hypotheses that have nothing to do with expressivism. But since there are many 
possible auxiliary hypotheses, it is unclear why the expressivist should need to pick one, 
rather than simply noting that the details depend on debates in philosophy of  mind, and 
that she has an answer compatible with a number of  ways of  such debates might turn 
out. 
 Köhler’s proposal illustrates the same point. Köhler starts with a bifurcation in 
the nature of  desire. Desires with normative contents have a different functional role 
from those with nonnormative contents. The latter have the motivate action—
 For discussion of  to what extent intentions must be consistent with beliefs that satisfying the 9
intention is possibly, see (Holton 2009: 40ff.). Note again that the expressivist could give many 




specifically they have the functional role of  motivating us to pursue those features of  the 
environment that nonnormative beliefs have the functional role of  tracking (205). 
Normative desires, on the other hand, dispose us ‘to take pleasure in entertaining the 
thought that p’ (206). As noted above, entertaining the thought that p is then analysed in 
terms of  simulating the belief  that p. Thus both kinds of  desires are individuated by their 
relation to the relevant beliefs—mediated by the state of  entertaining. But again, as the 
case of  Beddor shows, accepting a bifurcated account of  desires is orthogonal to 
expressivism. This is an independent thesis in philosophy of  mind. 
 Perhaps the complaint is that this solution amounts to a mere list of  the 
properties a state of  hoping, desiring, or fearing that p for some normative p needs to 
have.  This is reminiscent of  Schroeder’s objection to Gibbard’s expressivism: it 10
provides a mere list of  what the attitudes expressed by our sentences must be like, and so 
is not explanatory (2008: 52). The problem is that this objection is itself  unclear. As 
Baker and Woods note in response, providing a recipe that specifies the functional role 
of  the attitude expressed by any arbitrary sentence seems constructive, at least until we 
see an explicit argument for stricter conditions on constructiveness (2015: 411-12, fn. 
69). Likewise, those who think the problem of  attitudinal embeddings must be hard need 
to argue that the solution must go beyond a description of  the functional relations that 
ground having some normative p as a content. To repeat, a metaethical realist is allowed 
to give a placeholder solution: ‘To hope that murder is wrong is to have the attitude of  
hope—whatever that turns out to be—to the proposition that murder is wrong—
whatever that is’. In light of  this, it is hard to make out why an expressivist is forbidden 
from giving answers that similarly leave the details to other parts of  philosophy. 
 The worry may be that even if  we can specify the functional role such an attitude 
would have to play, we have no reason to think that there is any state that plays that 
functional role. But the reason to think that there are states playing the relevant roles is 
 Thanks to a referee of  an earlier draft for raising this problem.10
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the intuitive data that motivated the many attitudes problem in the first place. We say that 
people hope that murder is wrong or worry that eating meat is wrong. Given the general 
acceptance of  folk psychology, we presumably have some defeasible justification for 
assuming these commonsensical attitude ascriptions are sometimes true. But then that is 
reason to think that there is some state fulfilling the relevant functional role. 
 This may seem to get the cart before the horse. Doesn’t it assume that the 
expressivist analysis of  the functional roles of  the relevant attitudes is correct? It does, 
but recall the dialectic. I am arguing that insofar as the many attitudes problem is a 
distinct problem, is not a very substantial one. If  the expressivist can solve the Frege-
Geach problem, then the many attitudes problem is easily solved. Assume she can solve 
the Frege-Geach problem. Then take your preferred story about how hope that murder 
is wrong is functionally related (directly or indirectly) to the attitude expressed by 
‘Murder is wrong’. She will tell the exact same story. Your objection can’t be to the 
functional story she just told about the nature of  hope—it’s your own story. Is your 
objection then to her analysis of  the attitude expressed by ‘Murder is wrong’? Okay. But 
in that case the objection is that the many attitudes problem cannot be solved—if  
expressivism is false. This is true, but now the many attitudes problem no longer serves 
as a distinct objection to the theory. 
5.2. Massive Coincidence 
A more substantial problem is presented by Derek Shiller (2017). Why do our normative 
beliefs have the same functional relation to hope, fear, anger and so on as our 
nonnormative beliefs? The objection is that for the expressivist, ‘belief ’ names a 
disjunction of  mental states. Normative beliefs are not the same kind of  attitude as 
nonnormative beliefs—the former are really a kind of  desire-like state. But why would 
the attitude-type hope interact with a desire-like state in the same way that it interacts 
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with a state that is not desire-like, namely nonnormative belief ? The expressivist seems 
committed to a massive coincidence. 
 In reply, we should first note that the expressivist can deny that ‘belief ’ names a 
disjunction of  states on her view: belief  is a genus, with normative and nonnormative 
species. What all beliefs have in common is that they are expressed through assertoric 
speech acts, that they can be true or false, and that they interact with other beliefs to 
maintain logical coherence. This does not fully answer Shiller’s objection on its own, but 
it does force us to be clearer about what the puzzle is. After all, the expressivist can 
maintain, at least initially, that there is no massive coincidence. We have a unified attitude-
type, belief, and all beliefs interact with token cases of  hope or fear or anger in the same 
kinds of  ways. Why does the fact that the category of  belief  divides into two 
subcategories introduce a mystery? 
 There are two obvious concerns. First, the commonalities which hold this genus 
together seem relatively superficial. That both species are expressible through assertions 
may explain, for example, why we categorise them together in everyday language. But 
normative beliefs are, according to the expressivist, desire-like, and so they seem more 
naturally classed with desires and intentions than with nonnormative beliefs. The second 
reason for concern is that we normally understand fear, anger, hope, and so on as 
responsive in various ways to our picture of  what the world is like. But according to the 
expressivist, normative beliefs are not part of  our picture of  what the world is like (save 
for some deflationary sense, which is more a matter of  linguistic convenience than 
anything else). 
 The answer to these concerns is that if  normative attitudes share in these 
seemingly superficial commonalities then a person’s normative perspective will share 
important features in common with their picture of  what the world is like. We can see 
this by first considering motivating attitudes which we will stipulate are not assertorically 
expressible, then stipulate that another class of  functionally similar attitudes is 
 20
Deflating Many Attitudes
assertorically expressible. We will see that to be assertorically expressible, the attitudes 
will need other, “deeper” properties in common with nonnormative beliefs. 
 Start with intention, stipulating that it is not expressed assertorically. The 
intention to murder Bob and the intention not to murder Bob are functionally 
incompatible. But notice that if  we divide the two incompatible attitudes among two 
different people, those people need not disagree or regard the other’s intention as 
mistaken. If  I intend to murder Bob, I may well regard your intention not to murder him 
as unproblematic. People have different life projects, after all. One and the same person 
cannot have both intentions, but if  they are split up among multiple people, we can each 
go our own way. 
 Imagine instead that there are intention-like states, with the same kind of  
functional incompatibilities, but now expressible through normative assertions. Imagine 
that I have the intention-like state toward murdering Bob, and you have the intention-like 
state toward refraining. Now there must be disagreement between us, at least on the 
general strategy for solving the Frege-Geach problem discussed in section 3. On that 
strategy, remember, semantic relations between normative assertions are explained in 
terms of  functional relations between the attitudes those assertions express. The 
attitudes are functionally incompatible, and so the assertions expressing them must be 
semantically incompatible. So we must disagree. We cannot both be right. The superficial 
commonality—being assertorically expressible—predicts a more significant commonality. 
Beliefs, whether normative or nonnormative, commit us to understanding incompatible 
beliefs as mistaken. 
 Note that this claim of  a link between assertoric expressibility and disagreement 
is neutral on the order of  explanation. It may be that attitudes are assertorically 
expressible because it is the nature of  these attitudes to place their holders in relations of  
disagreement. There is something special about the functional role of  our intention-like 
states, some functional difference between them and ordinary intentions, in virtue of  
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which they commit those who hold them to interpersonal disagreement, and because of  
this, they are assertorically expressible. But it may be that these attitudes place their 
holders in relations of  disagreement because they are assertorically expressible. It is not 
the functional roles of  the intention-like attitudes themselves that produces the 
disagreement. Rather, part of  learning normative language is being socialised into 
regarding those with incompatible intention-like attitudes as mistaken. 
 Given this, there will be rational pressure against adopting a new normative 
attitude arbitrarily, the way one might change one’s mind whether to go to the grocery or 
bookstore first. If  I believe eating meat is fine, I am implicitly committed to thinking that 
those who believe otherwise are mistaken, and that includes a future version of  me who 
thinks otherwise. I will be strongly disposed, then, to continue believing eating meat is 
fine unless presented with reasons to think my current perspective is inferior to one on 
which eating meat is wrong. In general, I will only revise my normative beliefs to the 
extent that a rival normative perspective seems superior. This means I will typically adopt 
a new normative belief  only because some of  my other normative beliefs favour doing 
so—and again, these normative beliefs will strike me at the time as attitudes it would be a 
mistake to change. 
 So my normative reasoning will seem to me much more like a process of  
discovery than invention. My normative perspective is largely fixed. Changing it without 
justification will seem to me like deliberately embracing error. When I change my 
normative perspective, I will understand myself  as guided by further normative 
principles. These further principles will themselves strike me as not to be changed, unless 
that is justified on the basis of  further principles, and so on. Ultimately changes to my 
normative perspective will feel like it is a matter of  answering to principles whose status 
as correct principles is already in place. 
 So we can fear, for example, that something might be wrong, or be happy about 
the same. Given how our normative attitudes function, it is as though these things can 
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turn out well or poorly for us and for other things we care about. It might turn out that 
eating meat is wrong, and, since meat is tasty, Bob hopes that it is not and will be sad if  it 
is. Even if  normative beliefs are not responses to what the world is like in the way that 
nonnormative beliefs are, there will be an important similarity from the point of  view of  
the normative reasoner. Whether eating meat is wrong will seem to her to be a matter to 
be figured out on the basis of  what she already regards correct. 
 To summarise my answer to the massive coincidence objection: first, the 
expressivist is not obviously positing massive coincidence. She can identify an unified 
class of  attitude—beliefs—with certain essential properties in common, and she simply 
posits that members of  this class can functionally interact in the same way with other 
attitudes such as fear, anger, hope, and so on. If  there is a massive coincidence, it is 
because what holds beliefs together are relatively superficial properties, and their deeper 
functional properties are very different. But the superficial commonalities must be 
accompanied by further properties, and these properties make it intelligible why we 
would, for example, hope or fear that p, for normative p’s. 
5.3. Can We Really Be Sure about All Attitudes? 
Despite its claims to neutrality and minimalism, the account here might seem to make a 
bold prediction. It predicts that all propositional attitudes can be individuated according 
to the final inductive definition offered. But what if  there is some attitude A, which 
cannot be analysed in terms of  functional relations, direct or indirect, to belief, and yet it 
still seems correct to us to say on occasion, ‘Bob A’s that eating meat is wrong’? Does it 
follow that expressivism fails?  
 Probably not. The concern raised by the many attitudes problem is that 
expressivism is massively revisionary, declaring that it is mistaken or even unintelligible to 
attribute desires, hopes, fears, and so on with normative content. It is a powerful 
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objection that a philosophical theory is massively revisionary; it is another thing when 
such a theory forces us to revise at the margins. This is still a cost, but one to be weighed 
holistically against the theory’s other costs and virtues. If  expressivism can accommodate 
the majority of  the supposedly problematic attitude-attributions, yet there remains a 
handful of  attitude-types which it cannot, then it asks us to revise at the margins. It 
would be a cost, but one to be compared to the costs of  metaethical alternatives. 
6. Conclusion 
Does this result in the systematicity we want? The view says that any utterance of  the 
form ‘As that p’ refers to a mental state that stands in the right kind of  functional or 
intentional relations to the mental state expressed by sincerely asserting the sentence ‘p’. 
The relations in question can be direct, or indirect—that is, A might be functionally 
related to an attitude which is about an attitude which… is functionally related to the 
state expressed by sentence ‘p’. The relations are different for different attitudes of  
course. But we want standing in the hope relation to p to be different from standing in 
the desire relation to p: and on this picture that difference amounts to a difference of  
functional relation to the state expressed by ‘p’. Spelling out these relations in detail is a 
job for philosophy of  mind. The only special commitment the expressivist needs to take 
on is that all attitudes (other than belief) that p can be individuated by their functional 
and intentional relations, direct or indirect, to the belief  that p. 
 This is all to say the problem is less serious than it initially appeared—or maybe 
rather that the only real difficulty is whether expressivists are really entitled to normative 
beliefs, and once that is in place the rest comes easily. But there is an interesting upshot: 
so long as some part of  our language has enough structure to allow for the standard 
array of  logical embeddings, attitudinal embeddings come cheap. 
 24
Deflating Many Attitudes
Lingnan University, Hong Kong SAR, China 
Works Cited 
Baker, D., and J. Woods (2015) ‘How Expressivists Can and Should Explain 
Inconsistency’, Ethics, 125/2: 391-424. 
Barrett, L. F. (2006) ‘Are Emotions Natural Kinds?’, Perspectives on Psychological Science, 1/1: 
28-58. 
Barrett, L. F. (2012) ‘Emotions Are Real’, Emotion, 12/3: 413-29. 
Barrett, L. F. (2018) How Emotions Are Made, First Mariner Books Edition, New York: 
Mariner Books. 
Beddor, B. (2020) ‘A Solution to the Many Attitudes Problem’, Philosophical Studies, 177/9: 
2789-813. 
Blackburn, S. (1984) Spreading the Word, New York: Oxford University Press. 
Bourget, D. and A. Mendolovici (2019) ‘Phenomenal Intentionality’, in E. Zalta (ed.) 
Stanford Encyclopedia of  Philosophy. <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2019/entries/
phenomenal-intentionality/>. 
Bratman, M (1999) Faces of  Intention, New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Carr, J. (2015) ‘Ecumenical Expressivism Ecumenicized’, Analysis, 75/3: 442-50. 
Chrisman, M (2008) ‘Expressivism, Inferentialism, and Saving the Debate’, Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research, 77/2: 334-58. 
Chrisman, M. (2015) The Meaning of  ‘Ought’: Beyond Descriptivism and Expressivism in 
Metaethics, New York: Oxford University Press. 
Dreier, J. (2004) ‘Meta-ethics and the Problem of  Creeping Minimalism’, Philosophical 
Perspectives 18: 23-44. 
Dunaway, B. (2010) ‘Minimalist Semantics in Meta-ethical Expressivism’, Philosophical 
Studies, 151/3: 351-71. 
Gendron, M., D. Roberson, J. M. van der Vyer, and L. F. Barrett (2014) ‘Perceptions of  
Emotion from Facial Expressions Are Not Culturally Universal: Evidence from a 
Remote Culture’, Emotion, 14/2: 251-62. 
Gibbard, A. (1990) Wise Choices, Apt Feelings: A Theory of  Normative Judgment, First Harvard 
Paperback Edition 1992, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Holton, R. (2009) Wanting, Willing, Waiting, New York: Oxford University Press. 
Horwich, P. (1998) Truth, New York: Oxford University Press. 
 25
Deflating Many Attitudes
Köhler, S. (2017) ‘Expressivism, Belief, and All That’, Journal of  Philosophy, 114/4: 
189-207. 
Köhler, S. (2018) ‘Expressivism, Meaning, and All That’, Canadian Journal of  Philosophy, 
48/3-4: 337-56. 
Mendolovici, A. (2018) The Phenomenal Basis of  Intentionality, New York: Oxford University 
Press. 
Schroeder, M. (2008) Being For: Evaluating the Semantic Program of  Expressivism, New York: 
Oxford University Press. 
Schroeder, M. (2013) ‘Two Roles for Propositions: Cause for Divorce?’, Nous, 47/3: 
409-30. 
Schroeder, T. (2004) Three Faces of  Desire, New York: Oxford University Press. 
Shiller, D. (2017) ‘The Problem of  Other Attitudes’, American Philosophical Quarterly, 54/2: 
141-52. 
Simpson, M. (2018) ‘Solving the Problem of  Creeping Minimalism’, Canadian Journal of  
Philosophy, 48/3-4: 510-31. 
Sinclair, N. (2011) ‘Moral Expressivism and Sentential Negation’, Philosophical Studies, 
152/3: 385-411. 
Timmons, M. (1999) Morality without Foundations, New York: Oxford University Press. 
Woods, J. (2017) ‘The Frege-Geach Problem’, in T. McPherson and D. Plunkett (eds.) The 
Routledge Handbook of  Metaethics, 226-42, New York: Routledge.
 26
